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src
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tools
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regression
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security
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cap_test
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Makefile
(518 B)
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cap_test.c
(3.11 KB)
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cap_test.h
(5.13 KB)
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cap_test.t
(180 B)
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cap_test_capabilities.c
(17.58 KB)
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cap_test_capmode.c
(6.46 KB)
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cap_test_fcntl.c
(3.24 KB)
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cap_test_pdfork.c
(3.02 KB)
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cap_test_pdkill.c
(2.69 KB)
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cap_test_relative.c
(5.22 KB)
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cap_test_sysctl.c
(2.08 KB)
Editing: cap_test_relative.c
/*- * Copyright (c) 2009-2011 Robert N. M. Watson * Copyright (c) 2011 Jonathan Anderson * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * $FreeBSD$ */ #include <sys/cdefs.h> __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); #include <sys/param.h> #include <sys/capsicum.h> #include <sys/errno.h> #include <err.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <unistd.h> #include "cap_test.h" /* * Test openat(2) in a variety of sitations to ensure that it obeys Capsicum * "strict relative" rules: * * 1. Use strict relative lookups in capability mode or when operating * relative to a capability. * 2. When performing strict relative lookups, absolute paths (including * symlinks to absolute paths) are not allowed, nor are paths containing * '..' components. */ int test_relative(void) { int success = PASSED; int fd, etc, etc_cap, etc_cap_ro, etc_cap_base, etc_cap_all; cap_rights_t baserights = CAP_READ | CAP_WRITE | CAP_SEEK | CAP_LOOKUP; cap_rights_t rights; REQUIRE(etc = open("/etc/", O_RDONLY)); CHECK_SYSCALL_SUCCEEDS(cap_getrights, etc, &rights); CHECK_RIGHTS(rights, CAP_ALL); MAKE_CAPABILITY(etc_cap, etc, CAP_READ); MAKE_CAPABILITY(etc_cap_ro, etc, CAP_READ | CAP_LOOKUP); MAKE_CAPABILITY(etc_cap_base, etc, baserights); MAKE_CAPABILITY(etc_cap_all, etc, CAP_MASK_VALID); /* * openat(2) with regular file descriptors in non-capability mode * should Just Work (tm). */ CHECK_SYSCALL_SUCCEEDS(openat, etc, "/etc/passwd", O_RDONLY); CHECK_SYSCALL_SUCCEEDS(openat, AT_FDCWD, "/etc/passwd", O_RDONLY); CHECK_SYSCALL_SUCCEEDS(openat, etc, "passwd", O_RDONLY); CHECK_SYSCALL_SUCCEEDS(openat, etc, "../etc/passwd", O_RDONLY); /* * Lookups relative to capabilities should be strictly relative. * * When not in capability mode, we don't actually require CAP_LOOKUP. */ CHECK_SYSCALL_SUCCEEDS(openat, etc_cap_ro, "passwd", O_RDONLY); CHECK_SYSCALL_SUCCEEDS(openat, etc_cap_base, "passwd", O_RDONLY); CHECK_SYSCALL_SUCCEEDS(openat, etc_cap_all, "passwd", O_RDONLY); CHECK_NOTCAPABLE(openat, etc_cap_ro, "../etc/passwd", O_RDONLY); CHECK_NOTCAPABLE(openat, etc_cap_base, "../etc/passwd", O_RDONLY); /* * This requires discussion: do we treat a capability with * CAP_MASK_VALID *exactly* like a non-capability file descriptor * (currently, the implementation says yes)? */ CHECK_SYSCALL_SUCCEEDS(openat, etc_cap_all, "../etc/passwd", O_RDONLY); /* * A file opened relative to a capability should itself be a capability. */ CHECK_SYSCALL_SUCCEEDS(cap_getrights, etc_cap_base, &rights); REQUIRE(fd = openat(etc_cap_base, "passwd", O_RDONLY)); CHECK_SYSCALL_SUCCEEDS(cap_getrights, fd, &rights); CHECK_RIGHTS(rights, baserights); /* * Enter capability mode; now ALL lookups are strictly relative. */ REQUIRE(cap_enter()); /* * Relative lookups on regular files or capabilities with CAP_LOOKUP * ought to succeed. */ CHECK_SYSCALL_SUCCEEDS(openat, etc, "passwd", O_RDONLY); CHECK_SYSCALL_SUCCEEDS(openat, etc_cap_ro, "passwd", O_RDONLY); CHECK_SYSCALL_SUCCEEDS(openat, etc_cap_base, "passwd", O_RDONLY); CHECK_SYSCALL_SUCCEEDS(openat, etc_cap_all, "passwd", O_RDONLY); /* * Lookup relative to capabilities without CAP_LOOKUP should fail. */ CHECK_NOTCAPABLE(openat, etc_cap, "passwd", O_RDONLY); /* * Absolute lookups should fail. */ CHECK_CAPMODE(openat, AT_FDCWD, "/etc/passwd", O_RDONLY); CHECK_NOTCAPABLE(openat, etc, "/etc/passwd", O_RDONLY); /* * Lookups containing '..' should fail in capability mode. */ CHECK_NOTCAPABLE(openat, etc, "../etc/passwd", O_RDONLY); CHECK_NOTCAPABLE(openat, etc_cap_ro, "../etc/passwd", O_RDONLY); CHECK_NOTCAPABLE(openat, etc_cap_base, "../etc/passwd", O_RDONLY); REQUIRE(fd = openat(etc, "passwd", O_RDONLY)); CHECK_SYSCALL_SUCCEEDS(cap_getrights, fd, &rights); /* * A file opened relative to a capability should itself be a capability. */ REQUIRE(fd = openat(etc_cap_base, "passwd", O_RDONLY)); CHECK_SYSCALL_SUCCEEDS(cap_getrights, fd, &rights); CHECK_RIGHTS(rights, baserights); return success; }
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