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README
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extensions.c
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extensions_clnt.c
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extensions_cust.c
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extensions_srvr.c
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statem.c
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statem.h
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statem_clnt.c
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statem_dtls.c
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statem_lib.c
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statem_local.h
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statem_srvr.c
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Editing: extensions_clnt.c
/* * Copyright 2016-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include <openssl/ocsp.h> #include "../ssl_local.h" #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "statem_local.h" EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { /* Add RI if renegotiating */ if (!s->renegotiate) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { if (s->ext.hostname == NULL) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.hostname, strlen(s->ext.hostname)) || !WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SERVER_NAME, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } /* Push a Max Fragment Len extension into ClientHello */ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { if (s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode == TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; /* Add Max Fragment Length extension if client enabled it. */ /*- * 4 bytes for this extension type and extension length * 1 byte for the Max Fragment Length code value. */ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length) /* Sub-packet for Max Fragment Length extension (1 byte) */ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { /* Add SRP username if there is one */ if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */ || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH) || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login, strlen(s->srp_ctx.login)) || !WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC static int use_ecc(SSL *s) { int i, end, ret = 0; unsigned long alg_k, alg_a; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = NULL; /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) return 0; cipher_stack = SSL_get1_supported_ciphers(s); end = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); for (i = 0; i < end; i++) { const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i); alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey; alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) || c->min_tls >= TLS1_3_VERSION) { ret = 1; break; } } sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipher_stack); return ret; } EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { const unsigned char *pformats; size_t num_formats; if (!use_ecc(s)) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */ tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats); if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) /* Sub-packet for formats extension */ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL; size_t num_groups = 0, i; if (!use_ecc(s)) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; /* * Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message */ /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for DHE groups */ tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups); if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups) /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } /* Copy curve ID if supported */ for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) { uint16_t ctmp = pgroups[i]; if (tls_curve_allowed(s, ctmp, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) { if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, ctmp)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } } } if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #endif EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { size_t ticklen; if (!tls_use_ticket(s)) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!s->new_session && s->session != NULL && s->session->ext.tick != NULL && s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION) { ticklen = s->session->ext.ticklen; } else if (s->session && s->ext.session_ticket != NULL && s->ext.session_ticket->data != NULL) { ticklen = s->ext.session_ticket->length; s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } memcpy(s->session->ext.tick, s->ext.session_ticket->data, ticklen); s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen; } else { ticklen = 0; } if (ticklen == 0 && s->ext.session_ticket != NULL && s->ext.session_ticket->data == NULL) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { size_t salglen; const uint16_t *salg; if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &salg); if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) /* Sub-packet for the actual list */ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen) || !WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SIG_ALGS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { int i; /* This extension isn't defined for client Certificates */ if (x != NULL) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) /* Sub-packet for status request extension */ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) /* Sub-packet for the ids */ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->ext.ocsp.ids); i++) { unsigned char *idbytes; OCSP_RESPID *id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->ext.ocsp.ids, i); int idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL); if (idlen <= 0 /* Sub-packet for an individual id */ || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes) || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } } if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } if (s->ext.ocsp.exts) { unsigned char *extbytes; int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->ext.ocsp.exts, NULL); if (extlen < 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes) || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->ext.ocsp.exts, &extbytes) != extlen) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } } if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_npn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb == NULL || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; /* * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support * for Next Protocol Negotiation */ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_NPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #endif EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { s->s3->alpn_sent = 0; if (s->ext.alpn == NULL || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_ALPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } s->s3->alpn_sent = 1; return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s); int i, end; if (clnt == NULL) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } end = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt); for (i = 0; i < end; i++) { const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i); if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } } if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) /* Add an empty use_mki value */ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #endif EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_ETM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_sct(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { if (s->ct_validation_callback == NULL) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; /* Not defined for client Certificates */ if (x != NULL) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SCT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #endif EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EMS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { int currv, min_version, max_version, reason; reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version, NULL); if (reason != 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, reason); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } /* * Don't include this if we can't negotiate TLSv1.3. We can do a straight * comparison here because we will never be called in DTLS. */ if (max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } for (currv = max_version; currv >= min_version; currv--) { if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, currv)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } } if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } /* * Construct a psk_kex_modes extension. */ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 int nodhe = s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk_kex_modes) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE) || (nodhe && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE)) || !WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK_KEX_MODES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } s->ext.psk_kex_mode = TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE; if (nodhe) s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE; #endif return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 static int add_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int curve_id) { unsigned char *encoded_point = NULL; EVP_PKEY *key_share_key = NULL; size_t encodedlen; if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) { if (!ossl_assert(s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } /* * Could happen if we got an HRR that wasn't requesting a new key_share */ key_share_key = s->s3->tmp.pkey; } else { key_share_key = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id); if (key_share_key == NULL) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return 0; } } /* Encode the public key. */ encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(key_share_key, &encoded_point); if (encodedlen == 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } /* Create KeyShareEntry */ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curve_id) || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encoded_point, encodedlen)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } /* * TODO(TLS1.3): When changing to send more than one key_share we're * going to need to be able to save more than one EVP_PKEY. For now * we reuse the existing tmp.pkey */ s->s3->tmp.pkey = key_share_key; s->s3->group_id = curve_id; OPENSSL_free(encoded_point); return 1; err: if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key); OPENSSL_free(encoded_point); return 0; } #endif EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 size_t i, num_groups = 0; const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL; uint16_t curve_id = 0; /* key_share extension */ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share) /* Extension data sub-packet */ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) /* KeyShare list sub-packet */ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups); /* * TODO(TLS1.3): Make the number of key_shares sent configurable. For * now, just send one */ if (s->s3->group_id != 0) { curve_id = s->s3->group_id; } else { for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) { if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pgroups[i], SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) continue; curve_id = pgroups[i]; break; } } if (curve_id == 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } if (!add_key_share(s, pkt, curve_id)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; #else return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; #endif } EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_cookie(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { EXT_RETURN ret = EXT_RETURN_FAIL; /* Should only be set if we've had an HRR */ if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie) /* Extension data sub-packet */ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.tls13_cookie, s->ext.tls13_cookie_len) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_COOKIE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto end; } ret = EXT_RETURN_SENT; end: OPENSSL_free(s->ext.tls13_cookie); s->ext.tls13_cookie = NULL; s->ext.tls13_cookie_len = 0; return ret; } EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1]; #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ const unsigned char *id = NULL; size_t idlen = 0; SSL_SESSION *psksess = NULL; SSL_SESSION *edsess = NULL; const EVP_MD *handmd = NULL; if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) handmd = ssl_handshake_md(s); if (s->psk_use_session_cb != NULL && (!s->psk_use_session_cb(s, handmd, &id, &idlen, &psksess) || (psksess != NULL && psksess->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION))) { SSL_SESSION_free(psksess); SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_BAD_PSK); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK if (psksess == NULL && s->psk_client_callback != NULL) { unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; size_t psklen = 0; memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity)); psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, NULL, identity, sizeof(identity) - 1, psk, sizeof(psk)); if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } else if (psklen > 0) { const unsigned char tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id[] = { 0x13, 0x01 }; const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; idlen = strlen(identity); if (idlen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } id = (unsigned char *)identity; /* * We found a PSK using an old style callback. We don't know * the digest so we default to SHA256 as per the TLSv1.3 spec */ cipher = SSL_CIPHER_find(s, tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id); if (cipher == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } psksess = SSL_SESSION_new(); if (psksess == NULL || !SSL_SESSION_set1_master_key(psksess, psk, psklen) || !SSL_SESSION_set_cipher(psksess, cipher) || !SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(psksess, TLS1_3_VERSION)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen); } } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession); s->psksession = psksess; if (psksess != NULL) { OPENSSL_free(s->psksession_id); s->psksession_id = OPENSSL_memdup(id, idlen); if (s->psksession_id == NULL) { s->psksession_id_len = 0; SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } s->psksession_id_len = idlen; } if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING || (s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0 && (psksess == NULL || psksess->ext.max_early_data == 0))) { s->max_early_data = 0; return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; } edsess = s->session->ext.max_early_data != 0 ? s->session : psksess; s->max_early_data = edsess->ext.max_early_data; if (edsess->ext.hostname != NULL) { if (s->ext.hostname == NULL || (s->ext.hostname != NULL && strcmp(s->ext.hostname, edsess->ext.hostname) != 0)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_SNI); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } } if ((s->ext.alpn == NULL && edsess->ext.alpn_selected != NULL)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_ALPN); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } /* * Verify that we are offering an ALPN protocol consistent with the early * data. */ if (edsess->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) { PACKET prots, alpnpkt; int found = 0; if (!PACKET_buf_init(&prots, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&prots, &alpnpkt)) { if (PACKET_equal(&alpnpkt, edsess->ext.alpn_selected, edsess->ext.alpn_selected_len)) { found = 1; break; } } if (!found) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_ALPN); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } } if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } /* * We set this to rejected here. Later, if the server acknowledges the * extension, we set it to accepted. */ s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED; s->ext.early_data_ok = 1; return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #define F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN 0xff #define F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN 0x200 /* * PSK pre binder overhead = * 2 bytes for TLSEXT_TYPE_psk * 2 bytes for extension length * 2 bytes for identities list length * 2 bytes for identity length * 4 bytes for obfuscated_ticket_age * 2 bytes for binder list length * 1 byte for binder length * The above excludes the number of bytes for the identity itself and the * subsequent binder bytes */ #define PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 4 + 2 + 1) EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_padding(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { unsigned char *padbytes; size_t hlen; if ((s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) == 0) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; /* * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See RFC7685. * This code calculates the length of all extensions added so far but * excludes the PSK extension (because that MUST be written last). Therefore * this extension MUST always appear second to last. */ if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PADDING, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } /* * If we're going to send a PSK then that will be written out after this * extension, so we need to calculate how long it is going to be. */ if (s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION && s->session->ext.ticklen != 0 && s->session->cipher != NULL) { const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2); if (md != NULL) { /* * Add the fixed PSK overhead, the identity length and the binder * length. */ hlen += PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD + s->session->ext.ticklen + EVP_MD_size(md); } } if (hlen > F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN && hlen < F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN) { /* Calculate the amount of padding we need to add */ hlen = F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN - hlen; /* * Take off the size of extension header itself (2 bytes for type and * 2 bytes for length bytes), but ensure that the extension is at least * 1 byte long so as not to have an empty extension last (WebSphere 7.x, * 8.x are intolerant of that condition) */ if (hlen > 4) hlen -= 4; else hlen = 1; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding) || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PADDING, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } memset(padbytes, 0, hlen); } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } /* * Construct the pre_shared_key extension */ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 uint32_t now, agesec, agems = 0; size_t reshashsize = 0, pskhashsize = 0, binderoffset, msglen; unsigned char *resbinder = NULL, *pskbinder = NULL, *msgstart = NULL; const EVP_MD *handmd = NULL, *mdres = NULL, *mdpsk = NULL; int dores = 0; s->ext.tick_identity = 0; /* * Note: At this stage of the code we only support adding a single * resumption PSK. If we add support for multiple PSKs then the length * calculations in the padding extension will need to be adjusted. */ /* * If this is an incompatible or new session then we have nothing to resume * so don't add this extension. */ if (s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION || (s->session->ext.ticklen == 0 && s->psksession == NULL)) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) handmd = ssl_handshake_md(s); if (s->session->ext.ticklen != 0) { /* Get the digest associated with the ciphersuite in the session */ if (s->session->cipher == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } mdres = ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2); if (mdres == NULL) { /* * Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session. * Ignore it */ goto dopsksess; } if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING && mdres != handmd) { /* * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the session * so we can't use it. */ goto dopsksess; } /* * Technically the C standard just says time() returns a time_t and says * nothing about the encoding of that type. In practice most * implementations follow POSIX which holds it as an integral type in * seconds since epoch. We've already made the assumption that we can do * this in multiple places in the code, so portability shouldn't be an * issue. */ now = (uint32_t)time(NULL); agesec = now - (uint32_t)s->session->time; /* * We calculate the age in seconds but the server may work in ms. Due to * rounding errors we could overestimate the age by up to 1s. It is * better to underestimate it. Otherwise, if the RTT is very short, when * the server calculates the age reported by the client it could be * bigger than the age calculated on the server - which should never * happen. */ if (agesec > 0) agesec--; if (s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint < agesec) { /* Ticket is too old. Ignore it. */ goto dopsksess; } /* * Calculate age in ms. We're just doing it to nearest second. Should be * good enough. */ agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000; if (agesec != 0 && agems / (uint32_t)1000 != agesec) { /* * Overflow. Shouldn't happen unless this is a *really* old session. * If so we just ignore it. */ goto dopsksess; } /* * Obfuscate the age. Overflow here is fine, this addition is supposed * to be mod 2^32. */ agems += s->session->ext.tick_age_add; reshashsize = EVP_MD_size(mdres); s->ext.tick_identity++; dores = 1; } dopsksess: if (!dores && s->psksession == NULL) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (s->psksession != NULL) { mdpsk = ssl_md(s->psksession->cipher->algorithm2); if (mdpsk == NULL) { /* * Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session. * If this happens it's an application bug. */ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_PSK); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING && mdpsk != handmd) { /* * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the PSK * session. This is an application bug. */ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_PSK); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } pskhashsize = EVP_MD_size(mdpsk); } /* Create the extension, but skip over the binder for now */ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } if (dores) { if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, s->session->ext.ticklen) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, agems)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } } if (s->psksession != NULL) { if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->psksession_id, s->psksession_id_len) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } s->ext.tick_identity++; } if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &binderoffset) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || (dores && !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, reshashsize, &resbinder)) || (s->psksession != NULL && !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, pskhashsize, &pskbinder)) || !WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &msglen) /* * We need to fill in all the sub-packet lengths now so we can * calculate the HMAC of the message up to the binders */ || !WPACKET_fill_lengths(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } msgstart = WPACKET_get_curr(pkt) - msglen; if (dores && tls_psk_do_binder(s, mdres, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL, resbinder, s->session, 1, 0) != 1) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } if (s->psksession != NULL && tls_psk_do_binder(s, mdpsk, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL, pskbinder, s->psksession, 1, 1) != 1) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; #else return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; #endif } EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_post_handshake_auth(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 if (!s->pha_enabled) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; /* construct extension - 0 length, no contents */ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_post_handshake_auth) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT; return EXT_RETURN_SENT; #else return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; #endif } /* * Parse the server's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right */ int tls_parse_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { size_t expected_len = s->s3->previous_client_finished_len + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len; size_t ilen; const unsigned char *data; /* Check for logic errors */ if (!ossl_assert(expected_len == 0 || s->s3->previous_client_finished_len != 0) || !ossl_assert(expected_len == 0 || s->s3->previous_server_finished_len != 0)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } /* Parse the length byte */ if (!PACKET_get_1_len(pkt, &ilen)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR); return 0; } /* Consistency check */ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ilen) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR); return 0; } /* Check that the extension matches */ if (ilen != expected_len) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); return 0; } if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) || memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) != 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); return 0; } if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3->previous_server_finished_len) || memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->previous_server_finished_len) != 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); return 0; } s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1; return 1; } /* Parse the server's max fragment len extension packet */ int tls_parse_stoc_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { unsigned int value; if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 1 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &value)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } /* |value| should contains a valid max-fragment-length code. */ if (!IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(value)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH); return 0; } /* Must be the same value as client-configured one who was sent to server */ /*- * RFC 6066: if a client receives a maximum fragment length negotiation * response that differs from the length it requested, ... * It must abort with SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER alert */ if (value != s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH); return 0; } /* * Maximum Fragment Length Negotiation succeeded. * The negotiated Maximum Fragment Length is binding now. */ s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = value; return 1; } int tls_parse_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { if (s->ext.hostname == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } if (!s->hit) { if (s->session->ext.hostname != NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } s->session->ext.hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->ext.hostname); if (s->session->ext.hostname == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } } return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC int tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { size_t ecpointformats_len; PACKET ecptformatlist; if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ecptformatlist)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } if (!s->hit) { ecpointformats_len = PACKET_remaining(&ecptformatlist); if (ecpointformats_len == 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); return 0; } s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len = 0; OPENSSL_free(s->ext.peer_ecpointformats); s->ext.peer_ecpointformats = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformats_len); if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats == NULL) { s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len = 0; SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len = ecpointformats_len; if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ecptformatlist, s->ext.peer_ecpointformats, ecpointformats_len)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } } return 1; } #endif int tls_parse_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb != NULL && !s->ext.session_ticket_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_remaining(pkt), s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } if (!tls_use_ticket(s)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } s->ext.ticket_expected = 1; return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP int tls_parse_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { /* We ignore this if the server sends a CertificateRequest */ /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for this */ return 1; } /* * MUST only be sent if we've requested a status * request message. In TLS <= 1.2 it must also be empty. */ if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { /* We only know how to handle this if it's for the first Certificate in * the chain. We ignore any other responses. */ if (chainidx != 0) return 1; /* SSLfatal() already called */ return tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt); } /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */ s->ext.status_expected = 1; return 1; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT int tls_parse_stoc_sct(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { /* We ignore this if the server sends it in a CertificateRequest */ /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for this */ return 1; } /* * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we * need to let control continue to flow to that. */ if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) { size_t size = PACKET_remaining(pkt); /* Simply copy it off for later processing */ OPENSSL_free(s->ext.scts); s->ext.scts = NULL; s->ext.scts_len = (uint16_t)size; if (size > 0) { s->ext.scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size); if (s->ext.scts == NULL) { s->ext.scts_len = 0; SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SCT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.scts, size)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SCT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } } } else { ENDPOINT role = (context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO) != 0 ? ENDPOINT_CLIENT : ENDPOINT_BOTH; /* * If we didn't ask for it then there must be a custom extension, * otherwise this is unsolicited. */ if (custom_ext_find(&s->cert->custext, role, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, NULL) == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SCT, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } if (!custom_ext_parse(s, context, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_remaining(pkt), x, chainidx)) { /* SSLfatal already called */ return 0; } } return 1; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly * fill the length of the block. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. */ static int ssl_next_proto_validate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { PACKET tmp_protocol; while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol) || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_NEXT_PROTO_VALIDATE, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } } return 1; } int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { unsigned char *selected; unsigned char selected_len; PACKET tmppkt; /* Check if we are in a renegotiation. If so ignore this extension */ if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) return 1; /* We must have requested it. */ if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } /* The data must be valid */ tmppkt = *pkt; if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(s, &tmppkt)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return 0; } if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_remaining(pkt), s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } /* * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in * a single Serverhello */ OPENSSL_free(s->ext.npn); s->ext.npn = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); if (s->ext.npn == NULL) { s->ext.npn_len = 0; SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } memcpy(s->ext.npn, selected, selected_len); s->ext.npn_len = selected_len; s->s3->npn_seen = 1; return 1; } #endif int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { size_t len; /* We must have requested it. */ if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } /*- * The extension data consists of: * uint16 list_length * uint8 proto_length; * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */ if (!PACKET_get_net_2_len(pkt, &len) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1_len(pkt, &len) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len); if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) { s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0; SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len; if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL || s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len != len || memcmp(s->session->ext.alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected, len) != 0) { /* ALPN not consistent with the old session so cannot use early_data */ s->ext.early_data_ok = 0; } if (!s->hit) { /* * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have been * initialised to NULL. We should update it with the selected ALPN. */ if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len); if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) { s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = 0; SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len; } return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP int tls_parse_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { unsigned int id, ct, mki; int i; STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt; SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof; if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || ct != 2 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &id) || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); return 0; } if (mki != 0) { /* Must be no MKI, since we never offer one */ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE); return 0; } /* Throw an error if the server gave us an unsolicited extension */ clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s); if (clnt == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES); return 0; } /* * Check to see if the server gave us something we support (and * presumably offered) */ for (i = 0; i < sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt); i++) { prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i); if (prof->id == id) { s->srtp_profile = prof; return 1; } } SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); return 0; } #endif int tls_parse_stoc_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4) s->ext.use_etm = 1; return 1; } int tls_parse_stoc_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS; if (!s->hit) s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS; return 1; } int tls_parse_stoc_supported_versions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { unsigned int version; if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &version) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } /* * The only protocol version we support which is valid in this extension in * a ServerHello is TLSv1.3 therefore we shouldn't be getting anything else. */ if (version != TLS1_3_VERSION) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); return 0; } /* We ignore this extension for HRRs except to sanity check it */ if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) return 1; /* We just set it here. We validate it in ssl_choose_client_version */ s->version = version; return 1; } int tls_parse_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 unsigned int group_id; PACKET encoded_pt; EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->tmp.pkey, *skey = NULL; /* Sanity check */ if (ckey == NULL || s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &group_id)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } if ((context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) != 0) { const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL; size_t i, num_groups; if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } /* * It is an error if the HelloRetryRequest wants a key_share that we * already sent in the first ClientHello */ if (group_id == s->s3->group_id) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); return 0; } /* Validate the selected group is one we support */ tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups); for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) { if (group_id == pgroups[i]) break; } if (i >= num_groups || !tls_curve_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); return 0; } s->s3->group_id = group_id; EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey); s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL; return 1; } if (group_id != s->s3->group_id) { /* * This isn't for the group that we sent in the original * key_share! */ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); return 0; } if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &encoded_pt) || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } skey = EVP_PKEY_new(); if (skey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(skey, ckey) <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt), PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); EVP_PKEY_free(skey); return 0; } if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 1) == 0) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ EVP_PKEY_free(skey); return 0; } s->s3->peer_tmp = skey; #endif return 1; } int tls_parse_stoc_cookie(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { PACKET cookie; if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cookie) || !PACKET_memdup(&cookie, &s->ext.tls13_cookie, &s->ext.tls13_cookie_len)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_COOKIE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } return 1; } int tls_parse_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) { unsigned long max_early_data; if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &max_early_data) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_INVALID_MAX_EARLY_DATA); return 0; } s->session->ext.max_early_data = max_early_data; return 1; } if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } if (!s->ext.early_data_ok || !s->hit) { /* * If we get here then we didn't send early data, or we didn't resume * using the first identity, or the SNI/ALPN is not consistent so the * server should not be accepting it. */ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED; return 1; } int tls_parse_stoc_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 unsigned int identity; if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &identity) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } if (identity >= (unsigned int)s->ext.tick_identity) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY); return 0; } /* * Session resumption tickets are always sent before PSK tickets. If the * ticket index is 0 then it must be for a session resumption ticket if we * sent two tickets, or if we didn't send a PSK ticket. */ if (identity == 0 && (s->psksession == NULL || s->ext.tick_identity == 2)) { s->hit = 1; SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession); s->psksession = NULL; return 1; } if (s->psksession == NULL) { /* Should never happen */ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } /* * If we used the external PSK for sending early_data then s->early_secret * is already set up, so don't overwrite it. Otherwise we copy the * early_secret across that we generated earlier. */ if ((s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) || s->session->ext.max_early_data > 0 || s->psksession->ext.max_early_data == 0) memcpy(s->early_secret, s->psksession->early_secret, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); s->session = s->psksession; s->psksession = NULL; s->hit = 1; /* Early data is only allowed if we used the first ticket */ if (identity != 0) s->ext.early_data_ok = 0; #endif return 1; }
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