File Manager

003 File Manager

Current Path: /usr/src/sys/kern

📁 ..
📄 Make.tags.inc(2.13 KB)
📄 Makefile(302 B)
📄 bus_if.m(26.31 KB)
📄 capabilities.conf(13.67 KB)
📄 clock_if.m(1.7 KB)
📄 cpufreq_if.m(2.27 KB)
📄 device_if.m(10.41 KB)
📄 firmw.S(2.15 KB)
📄 genassym.sh(1.11 KB)
📄 genoffset.c(1.68 KB)
📄 genoffset.sh(3.58 KB)
📄 imgact_aout.c(9.45 KB)
📄 imgact_binmisc.c(18.64 KB)
📄 imgact_elf.c(76.32 KB)
📄 imgact_elf32.c(1.47 KB)
📄 imgact_elf64.c(1.47 KB)
📄 imgact_shell.c(8.41 KB)
📄 init_main.c(24.31 KB)
📄 init_sysent.c(95.3 KB)
📄 kern_acct.c(19.03 KB)
📄 kern_alq.c(24.97 KB)
📄 kern_clock.c(21.12 KB)
📄 kern_clocksource.c(23.34 KB)
📄 kern_condvar.c(11.28 KB)
📄 kern_conf.c(36.14 KB)
📄 kern_cons.c(15.75 KB)
📄 kern_context.c(3.59 KB)
📄 kern_cpu.c(30.77 KB)
📄 kern_cpuset.c(59.78 KB)
📄 kern_ctf.c(8.73 KB)
📄 kern_descrip.c(112.87 KB)
📄 kern_dtrace.c(2.94 KB)
📄 kern_dump.c(8.51 KB)
📄 kern_environment.c(22.75 KB)
📄 kern_et.c(7.1 KB)
📄 kern_event.c(62.49 KB)
📄 kern_exec.c(46.67 KB)
📄 kern_exit.c(34.61 KB)
📄 kern_fail.c(29.32 KB)
📄 kern_ffclock.c(12.66 KB)
📄 kern_fork.c(28.29 KB)
📄 kern_hhook.c(13.58 KB)
📄 kern_idle.c(2.74 KB)
📄 kern_intr.c(40.44 KB)
📄 kern_jail.c(112.67 KB)
📄 kern_kcov.c(15.32 KB)
📄 kern_khelp.c(9.45 KB)
📄 kern_kthread.c(11.8 KB)
📄 kern_ktr.c(11.93 KB)
📄 kern_ktrace.c(31.41 KB)
📄 kern_linker.c(54.3 KB)
📄 kern_lock.c(46.99 KB)
📄 kern_lockf.c(64.46 KB)
📄 kern_lockstat.c(3.8 KB)
📄 kern_loginclass.c(6.69 KB)
📄 kern_malloc.c(37.09 KB)
📄 kern_mbuf.c(43.16 KB)
📄 kern_mib.c(24.26 KB)
📄 kern_module.c(11.05 KB)
📄 kern_mtxpool.c(5.82 KB)
📄 kern_mutex.c(33.62 KB)
📄 kern_ntptime.c(32.49 KB)
📄 kern_osd.c(12.37 KB)
📄 kern_physio.c(5.74 KB)
📄 kern_pmc.c(8.89 KB)
📄 kern_poll.c(15.86 KB)
📄 kern_priv.c(9.14 KB)
📄 kern_proc.c(80.01 KB)
📄 kern_procctl.c(19.48 KB)
📄 kern_prot.c(57.94 KB)
📄 kern_racct.c(34.01 KB)
📄 kern_rangelock.c(8.67 KB)
📄 kern_rctl.c(53.87 KB)
📄 kern_resource.c(36.66 KB)
📄 kern_rmlock.c(28.27 KB)
📄 kern_rwlock.c(40.72 KB)
📄 kern_sdt.c(2.05 KB)
📄 kern_sema.c(4.85 KB)
📄 kern_sendfile.c(33.97 KB)
📄 kern_sharedpage.c(10.37 KB)
📄 kern_shutdown.c(43.34 KB)
📄 kern_sig.c(101.89 KB)
📄 kern_switch.c(13.85 KB)
📄 kern_sx.c(40.27 KB)
📄 kern_synch.c(18.17 KB)
📄 kern_syscalls.c(6.74 KB)
📄 kern_sysctl.c(67.24 KB)
📄 kern_tc.c(55.73 KB)
📄 kern_thr.c(14.14 KB)
📄 kern_thread.c(41.75 KB)
📄 kern_time.c(40.89 KB)
📄 kern_timeout.c(43.08 KB)
📄 kern_tslog.c(3.44 KB)
📄 kern_ubsan.c(50.74 KB)
📄 kern_umtx.c(107.14 KB)
📄 kern_uuid.c(11.68 KB)
📄 kern_xxx.c(10.44 KB)
📄 ksched.c(6.56 KB)
📄 link_elf.c(47.99 KB)
📄 link_elf_obj.c(44.41 KB)
📄 linker_if.m(3.96 KB)
📄 makesyscalls.sh(23.57 KB)
📄 md4c.c(7.89 KB)
📄 md5c.c(9.56 KB)
📄 msi_if.m(2.48 KB)
📄 p1003_1b.c(8.84 KB)
📄 pic_if.m(3.9 KB)
📄 posix4_mib.c(5.59 KB)
📄 sched_4bsd.c(45.03 KB)
📄 sched_ule.c(82.65 KB)
📄 serdev_if.m(3.49 KB)
📄 stack_protector.c(613 B)
📄 subr_acl_nfs4.c(37.42 KB)
📄 subr_acl_posix1e.c(17.71 KB)
📄 subr_atomic64.c(3.97 KB)
📄 subr_autoconf.c(7.7 KB)
📄 subr_blist.c(31.88 KB)
📄 subr_boot.c(5.8 KB)
📄 subr_bufring.c(2.21 KB)
📄 subr_bus.c(145.4 KB)
📄 subr_bus_dma.c(19.67 KB)
📄 subr_busdma_bufalloc.c(5.24 KB)
📄 subr_capability.c(11.93 KB)
📄 subr_clock.c(10.61 KB)
📄 subr_compressor.c(13.11 KB)
📄 subr_counter.c(4.44 KB)
📄 subr_coverage.c(6.17 KB)
📄 subr_csan.c(25.39 KB)
📄 subr_devmap.c(9.8 KB)
📄 subr_devstat.c(16.21 KB)
📄 subr_disk.c(8.54 KB)
📄 subr_dummy_vdso_tc.c(1.7 KB)
📄 subr_early.c(2.26 KB)
📄 subr_epoch.c(25.02 KB)
📄 subr_eventhandler.c(9.17 KB)
📄 subr_fattime.c(9.98 KB)
📄 subr_filter.c(12.2 KB)
📄 subr_firmware.c(13.88 KB)
📄 subr_gtaskqueue.c(20.19 KB)
📄 subr_hash.c(4.8 KB)
📄 subr_hints.c(12.87 KB)
📄 subr_intr.c(40.61 KB)
📄 subr_kdb.c(16.13 KB)
📄 subr_kobj.c(7.1 KB)
📄 subr_lock.c(18.81 KB)
📄 subr_log.c(7.64 KB)
📄 subr_mchain.c(11.06 KB)
📄 subr_module.c(12.98 KB)
📄 subr_msgbuf.c(10.6 KB)
📄 subr_param.c(10.93 KB)
📄 subr_pcpu.c(10.18 KB)
📄 subr_pctrie.c(20.99 KB)
📄 subr_physmem.c(11.52 KB)
📄 subr_pidctrl.c(5.43 KB)
📄 subr_power.c(3.13 KB)
📄 subr_prf.c(27.42 KB)
📄 subr_prng.c(3.36 KB)
📄 subr_prof.c(15.43 KB)
📄 subr_rangeset.c(8.5 KB)
📄 subr_rman.c(27.61 KB)
📄 subr_rtc.c(11.42 KB)
📄 subr_sbuf.c(20.53 KB)
📄 subr_scanf.c(15.59 KB)
📄 subr_sfbuf.c(6.17 KB)
📄 subr_sglist.c(22.83 KB)
📄 subr_sleepqueue.c(39.43 KB)
📄 subr_smp.c(31.62 KB)
📄 subr_smr.c(20.17 KB)
📄 subr_stack.c(6.47 KB)
📄 subr_stats.c(103.01 KB)
📄 subr_syscall.c(7.98 KB)
📄 subr_taskqueue.c(21.1 KB)
📄 subr_terminal.c(15.52 KB)
📄 subr_trap.c(10.87 KB)
📄 subr_turnstile.c(35.58 KB)
📄 subr_uio.c(11.38 KB)
📄 subr_unit.c(22.97 KB)
📄 subr_vmem.c(43.25 KB)
📄 subr_witness.c(84.59 KB)
📄 sys_capability.c(15.06 KB)
📄 sys_eventfd.c(8.42 KB)
📄 sys_generic.c(44.22 KB)
📄 sys_getrandom.c(4.21 KB)
📄 sys_pipe.c(45.14 KB)
📄 sys_procdesc.c(14.57 KB)
📄 sys_process.c(30.73 KB)
📄 sys_socket.c(20.11 KB)
📄 syscalls.c(22.73 KB)
📄 syscalls.master(60.26 KB)
📄 systrace_args.c(178.49 KB)
📄 sysv_ipc.c(6.53 KB)
📄 sysv_msg.c(48.65 KB)
📄 sysv_sem.c(49.85 KB)
📄 sysv_shm.c(43.93 KB)
📄 tty.c(55.14 KB)
📄 tty_compat.c(11.46 KB)
📄 tty_info.c(9.93 KB)
📄 tty_inq.c(12.22 KB)
📄 tty_outq.c(8.74 KB)
📄 tty_pts.c(19.74 KB)
📄 tty_tty.c(2.83 KB)
📄 tty_ttydisc.c(28.6 KB)
📄 uipc_accf.c(8.07 KB)
📄 uipc_debug.c(12.42 KB)
📄 uipc_domain.c(13.13 KB)
📄 uipc_ktls.c(55.7 KB)
📄 uipc_mbuf.c(52.45 KB)
📄 uipc_mbuf2.c(12.64 KB)
📄 uipc_mbufhash.c(4.9 KB)
📄 uipc_mqueue.c(64.64 KB)
📄 uipc_sem.c(25.18 KB)
📄 uipc_shm.c(50.47 KB)
📄 uipc_sockbuf.c(42.9 KB)
📄 uipc_socket.c(110.61 KB)
📄 uipc_syscalls.c(35.94 KB)
📄 uipc_usrreq.c(75.11 KB)
📄 vfs_acl.c(14.5 KB)
📄 vfs_aio.c(76.32 KB)
📄 vfs_bio.c(145.39 KB)
📄 vfs_cache.c(143.09 KB)
📄 vfs_cluster.c(28.36 KB)
📄 vfs_default.c(33.16 KB)
📄 vfs_export.c(14.55 KB)
📄 vfs_extattr.c(17.91 KB)
📄 vfs_hash.c(6 KB)
📄 vfs_init.c(15.86 KB)
📄 vfs_lookup.c(45.48 KB)
📄 vfs_mount.c(62.58 KB)
📄 vfs_mountroot.c(26.23 KB)
📄 vfs_subr.c(167.52 KB)
📄 vfs_syscalls.c(106.86 KB)
📄 vfs_vnops.c(86.28 KB)
📄 vnode_if.src(13.66 KB)

Editing: kern_priv.c

/*-
 * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-FreeBSD
 *
 * Copyright (c) 2006 nCircle Network Security, Inc.
 * Copyright (c) 2009 Robert N. M. Watson
 * Copyright (c) 2020 Mariusz Zaborski <oshogbo@FreeBSD.org>
 * All rights reserved.
 *
 * This software was developed by Robert N. M. Watson for the TrustedBSD
 * Project under contract to nCircle Network Security, Inc.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 *
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
 * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR, NCIRCLE NETWORK SECURITY,
 * INC., OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
 * TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR
 * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
 * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING
 * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS
 * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 */

#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");

#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/jail.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/lock.h>
#include <sys/mutex.h>
#include <sys/sx.h>
#include <sys/priv.h>
#include <sys/proc.h>
#include <sys/sdt.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>

#include <security/mac/mac_framework.h>

/*
 * `suser_enabled' (which can be set by the security.bsd.suser_enabled
 * sysctl) determines whether the system 'super-user' policy is in effect.  If
 * it is nonzero, an effective uid of 0 connotes special privilege,
 * overriding many mandatory and discretionary protections.  If it is zero,
 * uid 0 is offered no special privilege in the kernel security policy.
 * Setting it to zero may seriously impact the functionality of many existing
 * userland programs, and should not be done without careful consideration of
 * the consequences.
 */

static bool
suser_enabled(struct ucred *cred)
{

return (prison_allow(cred, PR_ALLOW_SUSER));
}

static int
sysctl_kern_suser_enabled(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
{
	struct ucred *cred;
	int error, enabled;

cred = req->td->td_ucred;
	enabled = suser_enabled(cred);
	error = sysctl_handle_int(oidp, &enabled, 0, req);
	if (error || !req->newptr)
		return (error);
	prison_set_allow(cred, PR_ALLOW_SUSER, enabled);
	return (0);
}

SYSCTL_PROC(_security_bsd, OID_AUTO, suser_enabled, CTLTYPE_INT |
    CTLFLAG_RWTUN | CTLFLAG_PRISON | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, 0, 0,
    &sysctl_kern_suser_enabled, "I", "Processes with uid 0 have privilege");

static int	unprivileged_mlock = 1;
SYSCTL_INT(_security_bsd, OID_AUTO, unprivileged_mlock, CTLFLAG_RWTUN,
    &unprivileged_mlock, 0, "Allow non-root users to call mlock(2)");

static int	unprivileged_read_msgbuf = 1;
SYSCTL_INT(_security_bsd, OID_AUTO, unprivileged_read_msgbuf,
    CTLFLAG_RW, &unprivileged_read_msgbuf, 0,
    "Unprivileged processes may read the kernel message buffer");

SDT_PROVIDER_DEFINE(priv);
SDT_PROBE_DEFINE1(priv, kernel, priv_check, priv__ok, "int");
SDT_PROBE_DEFINE1(priv, kernel, priv_check, priv__err, "int");

static __always_inline int
priv_check_cred_pre(struct ucred *cred, int priv)
{
	int error;

#ifdef MAC
	error = mac_priv_check(cred, priv);
#else
	error = 0;
#endif
	return (error);
}

static __always_inline int
priv_check_cred_post(struct ucred *cred, int priv, int error, bool handled)
{

if (__predict_true(handled))
		goto out;
	/*
	 * Now check with MAC, if enabled, to see if a policy module grants
	 * privilege.
	 */
#ifdef MAC
	if (mac_priv_grant(cred, priv) == 0) {
		error = 0;
		goto out;
	}
#endif

/*
	 * The default is deny, so if no policies have granted it, reject
	 * with a privilege error here.
	 */
	error = EPERM;
out:
	if (SDT_PROBES_ENABLED()) {
		if (error)
			SDT_PROBE1(priv, kernel, priv_check, priv__err, priv);
		else
			SDT_PROBE1(priv, kernel, priv_check, priv__ok, priv);
	}
	return (error);
}

/*
 * Check a credential for privilege.  Lots of good reasons to deny privilege;
 * only a few to grant it.
 */
int
priv_check_cred(struct ucred *cred, int priv)
{
	int error;

KASSERT(PRIV_VALID(priv), ("priv_check_cred: invalid privilege %d",
	    priv));

switch (priv) {
	case PRIV_VFS_LOOKUP:
		return (priv_check_cred_vfs_lookup(cred));
	case PRIV_VFS_GENERATION:
		return (priv_check_cred_vfs_generation(cred));
	}

/*
	 * We first evaluate policies that may deny the granting of
	 * privilege unilaterally.
	 */
	error = priv_check_cred_pre(cred, priv);
	if (error)
		goto out;

/*
	 * Jail policy will restrict certain privileges that may otherwise be
	 * be granted.
	 */
	error = prison_priv_check(cred, priv);
	if (error)
		goto out;

if (unprivileged_mlock) {
		/*
		 * Allow unprivileged users to call mlock(2)/munlock(2) and
		 * mlockall(2)/munlockall(2).
		 */
		switch (priv) {
		case PRIV_VM_MLOCK:
		case PRIV_VM_MUNLOCK:
			error = 0;
			goto out;
		}
	}

if (unprivileged_read_msgbuf) {
		/*
		 * Allow an unprivileged user to read the kernel message
		 * buffer.
		 */
		if (priv == PRIV_MSGBUF) {
			error = 0;
			goto out;
		}
	}

/*
	 * Having determined if privilege is restricted by various policies,
	 * now determine if privilege is granted.  At this point, any policy
	 * may grant privilege.  For now, we allow short-circuit boolean
	 * evaluation, so may not call all policies.  Perhaps we should.
	 *
	 * Superuser policy grants privilege based on the effective (or in
	 * the case of specific privileges, real) uid being 0.  We allow the
	 * superuser policy to be globally disabled, although this is
	 * currenty of limited utility.
	 */
	if (suser_enabled(cred)) {
		switch (priv) {
		case PRIV_MAXFILES:
		case PRIV_MAXPROC:
		case PRIV_PROC_LIMIT:
			if (cred->cr_ruid == 0) {
				error = 0;
				goto out;
			}
			break;
		case PRIV_VFS_READ_DIR:
			/*
			 * Allow PRIV_VFS_READ_DIR for root if we're not in a
			 * jail, otherwise deny unless a MAC policy grants it.
			 */
			if (jailed(cred))
				break;
			/* FALLTHROUGH */
		default:
			if (cred->cr_uid == 0) {
				error = 0;
				goto out;
			}
			break;
		}
	}

/*
	 * Writes to kernel/physical memory are a typical root-only operation,
	 * but non-root users are expected to be able to read it (provided they
	 * have permission to access /dev/[k]mem).
	 */
	if (priv == PRIV_KMEM_READ) {
		error = 0;
		goto out;
	}

/*
	 * Allow unprivileged process debugging on a per-jail basis.
	 * Do this here instead of prison_priv_check(), so it can also
	 * apply to prison0.
	 */
	if (priv == PRIV_DEBUG_UNPRIV) {
		if (prison_allow(cred, PR_ALLOW_UNPRIV_DEBUG)) {
			error = 0;
			goto out;
		}
	}

return (priv_check_cred_post(cred, priv, error, false));
out:
	return (priv_check_cred_post(cred, priv, error, true));
}

int
priv_check(struct thread *td, int priv)
{

KASSERT(td == curthread, ("priv_check: td != curthread"));

return (priv_check_cred(td->td_ucred, priv));
}

static int __noinline
priv_check_cred_vfs_lookup_slow(struct ucred *cred)
{
	int error;

error = priv_check_cred_pre(cred, PRIV_VFS_LOOKUP);
	if (error)
		goto out;

if (cred->cr_uid == 0 && suser_enabled(cred)) {
		error = 0;
		goto out;
	}

return (priv_check_cred_post(cred, PRIV_VFS_LOOKUP, error, false));
out:
	return (priv_check_cred_post(cred, PRIV_VFS_LOOKUP, error, true));

}

int
priv_check_cred_vfs_lookup(struct ucred *cred)
{
	int error;

if (__predict_false(mac_priv_check_fp_flag ||
	    mac_priv_grant_fp_flag || SDT_PROBES_ENABLED()))
		return (priv_check_cred_vfs_lookup_slow(cred));

error = EPERM;
	if (cred->cr_uid == 0 && suser_enabled(cred))
		error = 0;
	return (error);
}

int
priv_check_cred_vfs_lookup_nomac(struct ucred *cred)
{
	int error;

if (__predict_false(mac_priv_check_fp_flag ||
	    mac_priv_grant_fp_flag || SDT_PROBES_ENABLED()))
		return (EAGAIN);

error = EPERM;
	if (cred->cr_uid == 0 && suser_enabled(cred))
		error = 0;
	return (error);
}

static int __noinline
priv_check_cred_vfs_generation_slow(struct ucred *cred)
{
	int error;

error = priv_check_cred_pre(cred, PRIV_VFS_GENERATION);
	if (error)
		goto out;

if (jailed(cred)) {
		error = EPERM;
		goto out;
	}

if (cred->cr_uid == 0 && suser_enabled(cred)) {
		error = 0;
		goto out;
	}

return (priv_check_cred_post(cred, PRIV_VFS_GENERATION, error, false));
out:
	return (priv_check_cred_post(cred, PRIV_VFS_GENERATION, error, true));

}

int
priv_check_cred_vfs_generation(struct ucred *cred)
{
	int error;

if (__predict_false(mac_priv_check_fp_flag ||
	    mac_priv_grant_fp_flag || SDT_PROBES_ENABLED()))
		return (priv_check_cred_vfs_generation_slow(cred));

error = EPERM;
	if (!jailed(cred) && cred->cr_uid == 0 && suser_enabled(cred))
		error = 0;
	return (error);
}

003 File Manager

Editing: kern_priv.c

Upload File

Create Folder